Delivering (up) a copyright-based remedy for revenge porn by Lee, Y.
This is a repository copy of Delivering (up) a copyright-based remedy for revenge porn.




Lee, Y. (2019) Delivering (up) a copyright-based remedy for revenge porn. Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law and Practice, 14 (2). pp. 99-111. ISSN 1747-1532 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpy122
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press. This is an author produced 
version of a paper subsequently published in Journal of Intellectual Property Law and 




Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
Delivering (Up) a Copyright-Based Remedy for Revenge Porn 
 









Despite recent progress that has been made in the legal response to the problem of what is 
colloquially termed ‘revenge porn’, victims continue to face difficulties when seeking the 
removal of their private sexual images from third-party websites.  
While victims who are able to assert authorship and hence copyright ownership of 
these images can rely on the notice and takedown provisions found in the copyright laws of 
many jurisdictions to compel their removal, victims who are unable to make such a claim are 
left without a similar remedy. However, current proposals for victims to be recognized as the 
joint authors of such images, or to be granted a new exclusive right to prevent their 
distribution, would disrupt fundamental copyright principles in a manner disproportionate to 
their underlying aims. 
This article puts forward an alternative solution, drawing inspiration from the recent 
settlement in Chambers v DCR: where a claimant has succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief 
                                                          
*
 I would like to thank Dr Marta Iljadica and Dr Daniela Simone for their very helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this article. 
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against a defendant on the basis of the non-consensual distribution of the claimant’s private 
sexual images, the court may make a further order directing the defendant to assign any 
copyright they may have in the images to the claimant. This would function in a manner akin 
to the well-established remedy of delivery up.  
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1. Introduction: the problem of revenge porn1 
 
The non-consensual distribution of private sexual images,2 known colloquially as ‘revenge 
porn’, causes serious and immediate harms to its victims.3 Victims of revenge porn 
experience sustained levels of mental and emotional trauma, resulting in adverse effects on 
their mental health.4 They are also exposed to a much higher risk of harassment both online 
and – in cases where their contact details or other identifying information have been 
                                                          
1 The term ‘revenge porn’ is used throughout this article due to its familiarity and its resonance with the public, 
and should be understood as denoting all instances of the non-co sensual distribution of an individual’s private 
sexual images, regardless of the identity of the person engaging in such distribution or the motives underlying 
such distribution. However, it is acknowledged that this formulation is potentially misleading, as it appears to 
confine the scope of the objectionable behaviour specifically to the non-consensual distribution of an 
individual’s private sexual images by a former romantic or sexual partner in order to punish them for the 
breakdown of the relationship: see Justice Committee, Stage 1 Report on the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual 
Harm (Scotland) Bill (Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body, 2016), [41], [65] – [71]; Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs References Committee, Phenomenon Colloquially Referred to as ‘Revenge Porn’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2016), [2.3] – [2.9], [5.4] – [5.5]. Because of this, the term ‘image-based sexual abuse’ has been 
preferred by some commentators as being more accurate: see C McGlynn and E Rackley, ‘Image-Based Sexual 
Abuse’ (2017) 37 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 534, 535 – 537. 
2 On the characterisation of such images as ‘private and sexual’ rather than ‘intimate’ or ‘sexually explicit’, see 
McGlynn and Rackley (n 1) 540 – 543.  
3 A number of commentators have located this phenomenon on the spectrum of sexual violence: see N Henry 
and A Powell, ‘Sexual Violence in the Digital Age: The Scope and Limits of Criminal Law’ (2016) 25 Social & 
Legal Studies 397; C McGlynn, E Rackley and R Houghton, ‘Beyond “Revenge Porn”: The Continuum of 
Image-Based Sexual Abuse’ (2017) 25 Feminist Legal Studies 25.  
4 HL Deb 21 July 2014, vol 755, col 969; HC Deb 1 December 2014, vol 589, col 122; D Citron and M Franks, 




published alongside their images – in the physical world.5 In many cases, the association of 
their online profile with private sexual images is also likely to lead to the loss of professional 
and educational opportunities: it is not uncommon for victims of revenge porn to face 
dismissal from their current employment, or to encounter difficulties in securing future 
employment.6  
These harms are exacerbated by the ease with which information can be transmitted 
through the internet.7 As theorists such as Scott Lash and Manuel Castells have pointed out, 
information has become increasingly ‘liquid’ within the current technological environment: it 
is now capable of being communicated almost instantaneously across vast distances, without 
regard to national borders, and to a large and indeterminate audience.8 O  an image has 
been uploaded for the first time, it is readily accessible through a simple internet search, and 
can be easily viewed, forwarded and reposted by thousands or even millions of internet users. 
Because of this, a key priority for most victims of revenge porn is the removal of their images 
from the websites or social media channels to which they have been uploaded, in order to 
prevent further distribution.9 However, the difficulty of regulating online information flows 
                                                          
5 Citron and Franks (n 4) 350 – 351; McGlynn and Rackley (n 1) 545.  
6 HL Deb 21 July 2014, vol 755, col 971; HC Deb 1 December 2014, vol 589, col 122; Citron and Franks (n 4) 
352 – 353; McGlynn and Rackley (n 1) 545. 
7 HL Deb 21 July 2014, vol 755, col 969; HL Deb 21 July 2014, vol 755, col 972; Citron and Franks (n 4) 350; 
McGlynn and Rackley (n 1) 534 – 535; N Suzor, B Seignior and J Singleton, ‘Non-Consensual Porn and the 
Responsibilities of Online Intermediaries’ (2017) 40 Melbourne University Law Review 1057, 1058.  
8 S Lash, Critique of Information (Sage Publications, 2002); M Castells, The Rise of the Network Society 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). See also Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X 
EU:C:2011:685, [43] (CJEU citing Castells in discussing the globalization of information dissemination). 
9 Citron and Franks (n 4) 358 – 359; A Levendowski, ‘Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn’ (2014) 3 
NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law 422, 425; M Chon, ‘Copyright’s Other Functions’ 
(2016) 15 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 364, 371. 
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also means that the law faces significant challenges in providing victims of revenge porn with 
an effective remedy. 
 
1.1 Criminal law 
 
In the past, critiques of the law’s shortcomings in addressing the problem of revenge porn had 
focused primarily on the lack of a criminal offence targeted specifically at such behaviour, 
leaving prosecutors to rely on an unsatisfactory patchwork of laws relating to malicious or 
offensive communications, harassment and stalking, computer misuse, and blackmail.10 Since 
then, Parliament has introduced into the law of England and Wales a new statutory offence of 
‘disclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress’, in the form of 
section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (‘CJCA’).11 While this is generally 
viewed as a step in the right direction, commentators have also criticized the provision as 
being unduly narrow in a number of key respects.12 Among other things, the offence requires 
the images to have been disclosed ‘with the intention of causing … distress’ to the individual 
appearing in them.13 In practice, however, the distribution of such images might well be 
motivated by factors other than intent to cause distress to the victim, such as financial reward, 
                                                          
10 See respectively Communications Act 2003, s 127; Malicious Communications Act 1988, s 1; Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, ss 2, 2A, 4 and 4A; Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 1. See also Protection of Children Act 
1978, s 1. 
11 This is also the case in Scotland: see the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016. Similar 
offences have been introduced in Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and a number of states in 
Australia and the US.  
12 See e.g. A Gillespie, ‘“Trust Me, It’s Only for Me”: “Revenge Porn” and the Criminal Law’ [2015] 11 
Criminal Law Review 866, 866 – 870. 
13 See also CJCA, s 33(8). For critique, see Gillespie (n 12) 872 – 3.  
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notoriety, or even just ‘for a laugh’.14 This is especially the case with the thousands of 
internet users who spread the image further by forwarding or reposting it once it has been 
uploaded for the first time, but who have no direct connection with the victim. 
 Crucially, while the CJCA sets out a range of criminal penalties for persons who have 
been convicted of this new offence,15  it does not provide victims with a remedy against the 
operators of the websites through which the offending images have been distributed.16 
Schedule 8 to the CJCA provides for certain immunities from criminal liability where 
providers of information services are concerned, including the providers of hosting services. 
The relevant provision states that a hosting provider is not liable for any offence under 
section 33 for the storage of any information provided by its users, subject to the following 
conditions: (i) it had no actual knowledge, at the time it was stored, that the information was 
unlawful within the meaning of section 33; and (ii) upon obtaining such knowledge, it acts 
expeditiously to remove the information or to disable access to it.17 This mirrors the ‘safe 
harbour’ protections set out in the corresponding provisions of the E-Commerce Directive,18 
which have been implemented in the UK through the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2002.19 It is therefore only in very rare cases that a website operator will be 
                                                          
14 Gillespie (n 12) 871; J Ledward and J Agate, ‘“Revenge Porn” and s 33: The Story So Far’ (2017) 28 
Entertainment Law Review 40, 41; McGlynn and Rackley (n 1) 553 – 54. See also Crown Prosecution Service, 
Guidelines on Prosecuting the Offence of Disclosing Private Sexual Photographs and Films (2015). For critique 
of a similar requirement under the law of California, see Citron and Franks (n 4) 373 – 374. 
15 CJCA, s 33(9). 
16 See Suzor, Seignior and Singleton (n 7) 1066 (describing these websites as the ‘focal points of the internet’ 
which present ‘the most efficient means of policing content available’). 
17 CJCA, Schedule 8, para 5. 
18 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, art 14.  
19 SI 2002/2013. 
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found guilty of an offence under section 33, particularly as the requisite intent of causing 
distress to the victim would still have to be made out. This is borne out by the guidelines 
issued by the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to this new offence. The relevant passage 
notes that ‘[t]he offence does not itself force website operators to take action in relation to the 
uploaded material’, and envisions that, in a typical case, the removal of the offending images 
‘would be the responsibility of the website or social media provider’.20 
 
1.2 Misuse of private information 
 
Victims of revenge porn might stand a better chance of obtaining their desired remedy by 
making a claim under civil law. English law now recognizes a new tort of misuse of private 
information,21 which has its origins in the action for breach of confidence as well as article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’),22 the latter of which provides for 
the fundamental right to respect for an individual’s private and family life.23 This allows 
claimants to prevent the disclosure of information in respect of which they have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, unless this is outweighed by the defendant’s right to freedom of 
                                                          
20 There is some indication that the more reputable websites may voluntarily implement measures to facilitate 
the removal of revenge porn: Ledward and Agate (n 14) 42; Suzor, Seignior and Singleton (n 7) 1091 – 1092. 
21 See Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; Vidal-H l v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 
311. It has also been recognized as such in Northern Ireland: see CG v Facebook Ir land Ltd [2017] 2 CMLR 29. 
22 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1953. 
23 ECHR, art 8. The English courts began to give effect to this right in t e context of private information 
following the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, which imposes on them an obligation not to act in 
a way that is incompatible with a right guaranteed by the ECHR. 
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expression.24 The elements of the action are likely to be satisfied in a typical case of revenge 
porn,25 and a successful claimant would be able to seek both injunctive relief and damages 
against the perpetrator. 
 Perhaps most importantly, the tort of misuse of private information could potentially 
give victims access to an effective remedy against the operators of websites to which their 
private sexual images have been uploaded. As noted previously, the E-Commerce Directive 
confers on the providers of hosting services certain immunities from any liability arising from 
the storage of unlawful material by their users, provided that the hosting provider had no 
actual knowledge of such unlawfulness at the point of storage and, upon obtaining such 
knowledge, acts expeditiously to remove the material or disable access to it. Because of this, 
where images of a private and sexual nature have been uploaded by the users of a website 
without the consent of the individuals appearing in those images, the operator of the website 
will not incur liability for the tort of misuse of private information as long as it has no 
knowledge of the unlawfulness of the material.26 The most recent case law indicates, however, 
that once the victim has notified the website operator as to the unlawfulness of the material, 
the operator will come under an obligation to remove the material or disable to access to it. 
While the position is not entirely clear, several recent decisions of the Northern Irish courts 
suggest that a website operator who fails to do so will forfeit the immunity conferred by the 
                                                          
24 See Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; Von Ha nover v Germany (No 1) (2005) 40 
EHRR 1; McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 171; Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
25 See AMP v Persons Unknown [2011] EWHC 3454 (TCC), [24] – [32]; Contostavlos v Mendahum [2012] 
EWHC 850 (QB), [24] – [25]; JPH v XYZ [2015] EWHC 2871 (QB), [8]. 
26 See J Riordan, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford University Press, 2016), [12.131] (stating that 
this calls for knowledge that the material or its use or publication, is action ble rather than merely raising a 
prima facie case to answer). 
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E-Commerce Directive, thus exposing itself to liability for misuse of private information.27 In 
order to take advantage of this procedure, the victim need not have obtained a prior judicial 
determination as to the unlawfulness of the material, or even have commenced legal 
proceedings against the perpetrator. 
 The new tort of misuse of private information, together with the conditions attached to 
the safe harbour protections mandated by the E-Commerce Directive, thus potentially 
provides victims of revenge porn with a swift and streamlined procedure for compelling the 
removal of their private sexual images from the websites to which they have been uploaded. 
However, this is subject to an important caveat: victims will be able to avail themselves of 
this procedure only against the operators of websites that are located within the jurisdiction of 
the English courts. In many cases, these website operators may be located instead in 
jurisdictions that do not offer equivalent protection against interferences with privacy, or that 
provide intermediaries with even broader immunities than the E-Commerce Directive’s safe 
harbours. Where this is the case, victims of revenge porn are likely to encounter great 
difficulty even in fixing website operators with any liability at all.  
A case in point is the US, which is home to a large number of technology firms. 
Section 230 of its Communications Decency Act 1996 states hat: ‘No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider’.28 This has been given a broad 
interpretation by the US courts, so as to grant internet intermediaries immunity from liability 
for any information published or disseminated by their users through their services.29 The 
only statutory exceptions to the immunity conferred by section 230 relate to the imposition of 
                                                          
27 J20 v Facebook Ireland Ltd [2016] NIQB 98; CG v Facebook Ireland Ltd [2017] 2 CMLR 29. 
28 Title V of the US Telecommunications Act 1996. 
29 See Zeran v American Online, Inc 129 F 3d 327 (4th Circuit, 1997). 
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federal criminal liability, the enforcement of intellectual property rights, and most recently, 
the enforcement of sex trafficking laws at both federal and state level.30 While a number of 
US state legislatures have taken steps to criminalize revenge porn, it is not at present an 
offence under federal law. Although US law recognizes a number of privacy torts,31 the broad 
protections conferred upon internet intermediaries by section 230 preclude any claims from 
being successfully asserted against them on that basis. 
 
 
2. Copyright: an unlikely weapon  
 
Against this backdrop, copyright has emerged as an unexpectedly effective weapon for 
victims of revenge porn. Unlike the still-evolving law of privacy, copyright law has long been 
subject to international and regional harmonization, and the extent of harmonization has only 
increased with the passage of time.32 Many jurisdictions around the world have followed the 
lead of the US in implementing a ‘notice and takedown’ procedure to address the problem of 
                                                          
30 US Communications Decency Act 1996, s 230(e). The last exception was enacted pursuant to the Stop 
Enabling Sex Traffickers Act 2018 (‘SESTA’) and Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking 
Act 2018 (‘FOSTA’), which came into force on 11 April 2018. 
31 These are invasion of privacy, public disclosure of private fact, false light, and misappropriation: see W 
Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383. 
32 At the international level, see the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886; 
the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations 1961; the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right 1994; the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty 1996; the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996; the Marrakesh Treaty to 




online copyright infringement.33 This operates in effectively the same way as the conditions 
to the safe harbour protection conferred on hosting providers by the E-Commerce Directive; 
the main distinction is that the notice and takedown procedure is concerned solely with 
copyright-infringing material, rather than all types of unlawful material. Section 512 of the 
US Copyright Act 1976, for instance, immunizes hosting providers from any liability they 
may incur for copyright infringement as the result of material stored on their systems by their 
users, provided that they had no knowledge of the infringing nature of the material at the 
point of storage and provided that, upon obtaining such knowledge, they act expeditiously to 
remove the material or disable access to it.34 
 The images at the centre of a case of revenge porn typically consist either of 
photographs or videos, or both. Both photographs and films are protected under the copyright 
laws of the vast majority of jurisdictions.35 Where an image of this kind has been taken by the 
victim themselves – as would be the case with a ‘selfie’36 – the victim will be recognized in 
almost all jurisdictions as the author of the image and, correspondingly, as the owner of the 
copyright subsisting in it.37 The initial uploading of the image by the perpetrator would 
                                                          
33 These include Australia, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Taiwan, Singapore, South Africa, and 
South Korea. 
34 This provision was enacted pursuant to the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998, s 202. 
35 See e.g. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’), ss 1, 4 and 5B. There is a question as to whether 
the kind of photographs and videos under discussion meet the originality threshold that is required for the 
subsistence of copyright under the laws of most jurisdictions; however, the issue has yet to arise in practice. For 
critique, see E Rosati, ‘Why Originality in Copyright Is Not and Should Not Be a Meaningless Requirement’ 
(2018) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice < https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpy084> accessed 25 
June 2018 (advance online publication) 
36 See Levendowski (n 9), 426 (citing a survey which indicates that as many as eighty percent of such images 
may be ‘selfies’). 
37 See e.g. CDPA, s 11(1). 
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therefore constitute both an infringing reproduction and – depending on the jurisdiction38 – an 
infringing communication of the image to the public, as would subsequent acts of forwarding 
and reposting by other internet users.39 The operator of the website to which the image had 
been uploaded might then – again, depending on the jurisdiction and the circumstances of the 
case – incur secondary liability for the acts of infringement committed by its users.40 It could 
even be primarily liable for the unauthorized communication of the image to the public,41 or 
the public performance or display of the image.42 Where the copyright legislation in the 
website operator’s jurisdiction provides for a notice and takedown procedure, therefore, the 
victim will be able to compel the removal of the offending images by asserting their 
ownership of the copyright in them. The effectiveness of the notice and takedown procedure 
in providing a remedy for victims of revenge porn has not been lost upon commentators;43 
                                                          
38 The copyright laws of some jurisdictions, such as the US, do not at present r cognize an exclusive right to 
communicate the work to the public. The closest equivalent under US law would appear to b  the right to 
perform the work publicly or the right to display the work publicly: US Copyright Act 1976, ss 106(4) and (5). 
39 See EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), [45] – [46]; Paramount Home 
Entertainment International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479, [32] – [37]. 
40 See A&M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc 239 F 3d 1004 (9th Circuit, 2001) (vicarious infringement and 
contributory infringement); Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187 (authorizing 
copyright infringement) Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), [95] – [112] 
(authorizing copyright infringement and joint tortfeasance). 
41 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), [124] – [125]; EMI Records 
Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), [45] – [47]; Paramount Home Entertainment 
International Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 3479, [32] – [37]. 
42 See Perfect 10, Inc v Amazon.com, Inc 508 F 3d 1146 (9th Circuit, 2007), 1159 – 1160. 
43 J Lipton, ‘Combating Cyber-Victimization’ (2011) 26 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1103, 1143 – 1144; 
D Bambauer, ‘Exposed’ (2014) 98 Minnesota Law Review 2025, 2052 – 2056; Citron and Franks (n 4) 359 – 
360; Levendowski (n 9) 439 – 444; Suzor, Seignior and Singleton (n 7) 1081 – 1086. 
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indeed, it forms the basis for a number of proposals that have been put forward to address the 
problem of revenge porn.44 
 
2.1 The limitations of copyright and attempts at circumvention 
 
As the law currently stands, however, victims of revenge porn will be able to avail 
themselves of the notice and takedown procedure found in copyright law only if they are able 
to claim authorship and hence ownership of the copyright in their private sexual images. 
Where the images in question have been recorded by the perpetrator or by a third party, rather 
than the victim, there is no obvious ground on which such a claim might be asserted. 
Copyright law does not typically recognize the subject of a photograph or film as having any 
claim to authorship, nor does it confer on the subject of such a work the right to control its 
subsequent distribution.45 In such circumstances, therefore, the copyright in the images would 
vest in the perpetrator or the third party responsible for taking it, and the victim would have 
no entitlement under copyright law to prevent their further distribution. 
 Because of this, several commentators have sought to redefine the concept of 
authorship within copyright law so as to enable victims of revenge porn to be recognized as at 
least the joint authors of the images in which they appear.46 This is on the basis that the 
                                                          
44 See A Ronneburger, ‘Sex, Privacy, and Webpages: Creating a Legal Remedy for Victims of Porn 2.0’ (2009) 
21 Syracuse Science & Technology Law Reporter 1, 23 – 3 ; D Otero, ‘Confronting Nonconsensual 
Pornography with Federal Criminalization and a “Notice-and-Takedown” Provision’ (2016) 70 University of 
Miami Law Review 585, 609 – 613. 
45 Some jurisdictions do, however, confer moral rights on the subjects of photographs under certain limited 
circumstances: see CDPA, s 85. 
46 D Bambauer, ‘Beating Revenge Porn with Copyright’ (Info/Law, 25 January 2013) 
<https://blogs.harvard.edu/infolaw/2013/01/25/beating-revenge-porn-with-copyright/> accessed 21 May 2018; S 
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interest and value of these images stem almost entirely from their subjects, rather than from 
any contribution made by the party who recorded them. Another suggestion that has been put 
forward is the creation under copyright law of a new exclusive right in images of a private 
and sexual nature.47 This right would vest in the subject of such an image, and would entitle 
the subject to prohibit the distribution, performance or display – including the private 
distribution, performance and display – of the image in question. A third proposal is that the 
enforcement of the copyright in such images should be made conditional upon positive proof 
that they had been recorded with the full consent of their subjects, and with the understanding 
that they would be widely distributed.48 
 
2.2 Shortcomings of attempts at circumvention 
 
While these proposals are well-intentioned, it is submitted that they are also significantly 
flawed, either because they do not adequately take into account the motivations underlying 
the distribution of revenge porn, or because they introduce distortions into the existing 
structure of copyright law that are disproportionate to the aim of providing victims with an 
effective remedy. The suggestion that victims of revenge porn should be recognized as joint 
authors of the images in which they appear blurs the distinction that copyright law has 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Corbett, ‘The Case for Joint Ownership of Copyright in Photographs of Identifiable Persons’ (2013) 18 Media 
& Arts Law Review 330. 
47 Bambauer (n 43) 2056 – 2070, 2071 (describing this as being effectively a ‘new right of authorship’). 
48 A Bartow, ‘Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0’ (2008) 10 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment 
and Technology Law 799, 834 – 838; A Bartow, ‘Copyright Law and Pornography’ (2012) 91 Oregon Law 
Review 1, 44 – 46. 
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historically drawn between the creator of a work and its subject.49 If implemented, it could 
open the floodgates to a multiplicity of claims – including retrospective claims – by models 
and performers.50 This, in turn, could potentially disrupt already settled transactions that had 
been concluded on the basis of the creator of a work its sole author and hence the sole owner 
of the copyright subsisting in it. Going forward, the implementation of this proposal would 
result in highly fragmented copyright ownership for a significant proportion of works.51 A  a 
consequence, the transfer and management of rights would become exponentially more 
complex – not to mention more expensive – particularly where large-scale works involving 
thousands of performers are concerned.52 In short, such a proposal would require a radical 
change in a fundamental principle of copyright law, solely for the purpose of enabling the 
subjects of a very small subset of works to prevent the distribution of those works by third 
parties. While the underlying aim is undoubtedly a laudable one, it does not justify the far-
reaching consequences that would flow from such a fundamental reconceptualization of 
authorship. 
 The creation of a new exclusive right for victims of revenge porn in their images, 
meanwhile, would result in even more wide-ranging disruptions to established principles of 
copyright law.53 For one thing, the proposal calls for the vesting of an exclusive right in a 
                                                          
49 See S Frankel, ‘The Copyright and Privacy Nexus’ (2005) 36 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 
507, 520. 
50 This would be the logical consequence of the declaratory theory of judicial de sion-making, which has been 
accepted by the House of Lords: see Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, 378 – 379. 
51 See Garcia v Google, Inc 786 F 3d 733 (9th Circuit, 2015), 737.  
52 See Garcia v Google, Inc 786 F 3d 733 (9th Circuit, 2015), 742 – 743. See also Suzor, Seignior and Singleton 
(n 7) 1083 – 1084. cf Garcia v Google, Inc 766 F 3d 929 (9th Circuit, 2014). 
53 For further critique, see R Tushnet, ‘How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?’ (2014) 98 Minnesota Law 
Review 2346, 2349 – 2361. 
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party who is neither the author of the work nor the owner of the copyright subsisting in it; for 
another, it defines this exclusive right in a way that includes private acts of distribution, 
performance and display, even though copyright law has historically restricted the scope of 
the copyright owner’s exclusive control to such of these acts as are carried out in public.54 
Again, such a wholesale destabilization of copyright law is disproportionate to the remedial 
advantages that would be gained by the subjects of what is ultimately a very small proportion 
of works. 
 The proposal that the enforcement of copyright in images of a private and sexual 
nature should be made conditional upon the full and informed consent of their subjects, 
meanwhile, might well reduce the economic incentives for the commercial exploitation of 
such images. There is some basis for this argument in English law: in the past, courts had 
indicated that they would refuse to enforce the copyright in works that were ‘grossly 
immoral’55 or that had been created in ‘disgraceful circumstances’.56  However, this is likely 
to have a minimal impact on victims and perpetrators of revenge porn. A typical perpetrator 
is unlikely to be motivated by financial incentives; instead, broad distribution of the images 
will usually be their goal.57 Such a proposal, if implemented, might even have the perverse 
                                                          
54 UK and European copyright law do not recognize an exclusive right of public display, and the closest 
equivalent would appear to be the right to communicate the work to the public: see CDPA, ss 16 and 20; 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, art 3. 
55 Glyn v Weston Feature Film Co [1916] 1 Ch 261, 269 – 270. For an overview, see A Sims, ‘The Denial of 
Copyright Protection on Public Policy Grounds’ (2008) 30 European Intellectual Property Review 189. 
56 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 275 – 276. On the uncertainties 
inherent in exclusions of this kind, see generally L Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th edn, 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 122 – 123. 
57 Bartow (n 48) 45 – 46. See also Ronneburger (n 44) 17 – 19. 
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effect of increasing the further distribution of these images by third parties, emboldened by 
the knowledge that no action could be taken against them by the copyright owner.58 
 
 
3.0 The case of Chambers v DCR 
 
Having highlighted the shortcomings of the previous proposals, this article now seeks to put 
forward a remedy that would enable victims of revenge porn to take advantage of the notice 
and takedown procedure developed in the copyright context, while causing minimal or even 
no disruption to the fundamental principles of copyright law. It draws inspiration in part from 
the terms of the settlement arrived at in the case of Chambers v DCR.59 Here, the YouTube 
personality Chrissy Chambers brought an action for breach of confidence, misuse of private 
information and harassment against the defendant, with whom she had previously been 
romantically involved. Chambers’ contention was that the defendant had, towards the end of 
their relationship and without her knowledge or consent, recorded several films of himself 
engaging in sexual activity with her. A few years after their relationship came to an end, he 
had uploaded the films in question to a pornographic website, again without her knowledge 
or consent.60 One of Chambers’ main priorities in bringing the action was to compel the 
removal of the films from the websites to which they had been uploaded, both initially by the 
                                                          
58 Bartow (n 48) 48 – 49. See also Fraserside Holdings v Venus Adult Shops [2005] FMCA 997, [42]. 
59 See the Statement in Open Court dated 17 January 2018. 
60 As these acts were carried out prior to the entry into force of the CJCA, no criminal charges could be brought 
against the defendant on that basis. 
18 
 
defendant and subsequently by third parties. To this end, both she and her legal advisors 
considered it vital for her to secure ownership of the copyright in those films.61 
 Ultimately, Chambers was able to reach a settlement with the defendant. Under the 
terms of the settlement, the defendant admitted that the uploading of the films constituted a 
breach of confidence and a misuse of Chambers’ private information. He agreed to delete or 
destroy all images containing her likeness that remained in his possession, and to pay 
substantial damages as well as legal costs. Crucially, the defendant also agreed to assign his 
copyright in the films to Chambers. 
 The outcome in Chambers v DCR has been hailed in some quarters as setting a 
landmark precedent for future victims of revenge porn.62 Strictly speaking, of course, it does 
nothing of the kind: an out-of-court settlement establishes no legal precedent upon which 
                                                          
61 See J Kleeman, ‘The YouTube Star Who Fought Back Against Revenge Porn – And Won’ (The Guardian, 18 
January 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/18/chrissy-chambers-youtube-revenge-porn-legal-
victory> accessed 21 May 2018; J Wakefield, ‘Chrissy Chambers: Revenge Porn Almost Killed Me’ (BBC, 18 
January 2018) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-42733034> accessed 21 May 2018. 
62 See J Kleeman, ‘YouTube Star Wins Damages in Landmark UK “Revenge Porn” Case’ (The Guardian, 17 
January 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/17/youtube-star-chrissy-chambers-wins-
damages-in-landmark-uk-revenge-porn-case> accessed 21 May 2018; R Spillett, ‘Lesbian YouTube Star Wins 
Damages in Landmark UK “Revenge Porn” Case Against Her Ex-Boyfriend for Sharing Videos of Them 
Having Sex (Then She Proposes to Her New Partner Outside the High Court)’ (Mail Online, 17 January 2018) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5279927/Lesbian-blogger-wins-damages-revenge-porn-case.html> 
accessed 21 May 2018; K Corcoran, ‘A YouTuber Successfully Sued Her Ex-Boyfriend in a Landmark Revenge 
Porn Ruling – And Then Proposed to Her Co-Star on the Court Steps’ (Business Insider, 18 January 2018) 
<http://uk.businessinsider.com/chrissy-chambers-youtuber-wins-legal-case-against-ex-for-revenge-porn-2018-1> 
accessed 21 May 2018; J Kleeman, ‘The YouTube Star Who Fought Back Against Revenge Porn – And Won’ 
(The Guardian, 18 January 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/ 8/chrissy-chambers-youtube-
revenge-porn-legal-victory> accessed 21 May 2018. 
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future claimants may rely. Nevertheless, the terms of the settlement do point the way towards 




4.0 The proposal: ‘delivery up’ of the copyright in the images concerned 
 
The proposed remedy is this: where a claimant has succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief 
against a defendant for misuse of private information, and the claim is founded upon the non-
consensual distribution of the claimant’s private sexual images by the defendant, the court 
may, in a suitable case, make a further order directing the defendant to assign any copyright 
they may have in the images to the claimant, for the purpose of enabling the claimant to 
compel the removal of those images from third-party websites.63 This would, in effect, be 
akin to an order for delivery up ‘in aid of’ the injunction granted against the defendant. 
 Under English law, an order for delivery up is a well-established remedy for the 
action in breach of confidence,64 and has since been recognized as a remedy that is available 
for the tort of misuse of private information.65 It is also routinely awarded in cases involving 
                                                          
63 Many jurisdictions prescribe certain formalities that must be complied with for an assignment of copyright to 
be valid: see CDPA, s 90(3). 
64 On the historical origins of the remedy, see G Forrai, ‘Confidential Information – A General Survey’ [1971] 
Sydney Law Review 382, 391 – 392; J Stuckey, ‘The Equitable Action for Breach of Confidence: Is Information 
Ever Property?’ (1981) 9 Sydney Law Review 402, 427 – 430. 
65 Mosley v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 30, [41]. The remedy is routinely sought in cases involving the 
misuse of private information: see Price v Powell [2012] EWHC 3527 (QB), [41]; Khan v Khan [2014] EWCA 




the infringement of intellectual property rights.66 In such cases, an order for delivery up is 
typically granted in conjunction with an injunction to restrain the defendant from engaging 
either in further unauthorized use of confidential or private information or in further acts of 
intellectual property infringement, depending on the cause of action. In breach of confidence 
cases, the remedy usually takes the form of an order directing the defendant to deliver to the 
claimant for destruction any documents in their possession that contain confidential 
information belonging to the claimant.67 In cases involving the infringement of intellectual 
property rights, meanwhile, the defendant will generally be required to deliver up for 
destruction any infringing goods that are in their possession. 
The courts have made it clear that the aim of such an order is not to punish the 
defendant; rather, it is intended to augment the effectiveness of the injunction already granted 
against the defendant by removing the very means of making further unauthorized use of the 
information – or of committing further infringements – from the defendant’s possession.68 
                                                          
66 See Mergenthaler Linotype Co v Intertype Ltd (1926) 43 RPC 381. 
67 On occasion, the defendant may even be required to deliver up products or machinery created through the 
unauthorized use of such information: see Ormonoid Roofing and Asphalt  Ltd v Bitumenoids Ltd (1930) 31 SR 
(NSW) 347; Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1964]  WLR 96; Ansell Rubber Co Pty 
Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811.  
68 See Mergenthaler Linotype Co v Intertype Ltd (1926) 43 RPC 381, 382 (Russell J noting that, as long as 
infringing goods remain in the possession of the defendant, ‘he may be subject to too serious and grave a 
temptation and may thereby be tempted to commit a breach of the injunction which he would not otherwise 
commit’). See also D Vaver, ‘Civil Liability for Taking or Using Trade Secrets in Canada’ (1981) 5 Canadian 
Business Law Journal 253, 300 – 301; F Gurry, Breach of Confidence (Clarendon Press, 1984), 411 – 3; A 
Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (Oxford University Press, 2004), 583 – 586, 632; M 
Conaglen, ‘Thinking About Proprietary Remedies for Breach of Confidence’ [2008] 1 Intellectual Property 




The remedy proposed here is thus consistent with the overall aim of the order in its more 
conventional form, as it seeks to prevent – or at least reduce – further unauthorized 
dissemination of the claimant’s private information, although it does so by equipping the 
claimant with the means of halting such dissemination, rather than removing from the 
defendant the means of doing so. In this way, it seeks to ensure the effectiveness of th 
injunctive relief granted against the defendant. 
 
4.1 Possible objections to the proposal 
 
Two main objections can be made against the extension of the order for delivery up in the 
manner proposed here. The first is that the order has traditionally been directed at the delivery 
up of physical rather than intangible property. The second is that the order in its conventional 
form is one that directs the delivery up of the offending items to the claimant specifically for 
destruction. There is clear case law to the effect that a claimant who has received documents 
or other items from a defendant pursuant to such an order is obliged to destroy them; the 
claimant is not entitled to retain those items for their own use or benefit, as the property in the 
items remains in the defendant.69 In this context, the nature of the order under discussion 
must be distinguished from an order that directs a defendant to deliver up to the claimant 
items that are the physical property of the claimant.70 In a case involving breach of 
                                                          
69 See Delfe v Delamotte (1857) 3 Kay & J 581, 584; Hole v Bradbury (1879) 12 Ch D 886, 903 – 904; 
Ormonoid Roofing and Asphalts Ltd v Bitumenoids Ltd (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 347, 361 – 361; Ansell Rubber Co 
Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd [1972] RPC 811, 828. 
70 The latter type of order is most frequently awarded in successful actions for the tort of conversion. On the 
distinction between the two in practice, see Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De G & Sm 652, 713 – 718. See 
also Vavasseur v Krupp (1878) 9 Ch D 351, 360 – 361; Gurry (n 68) 411 – 413; Burrows (n 68) 585. cf 
Industrial Furnaces Ltd v Reaves [1970] RPC 605, 627 – 628. 
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confidence, the latter type of order would be appropriate where the defendant had physically 
purloined a confidential document belonging to the claimant.71 I  these circumstances, the 
basis of the order would lie in the claimant’s property right in the item, rather than the 
prevention of future breaches by the defendant, though it might have much the same practical 
effect where confidential or private information is concerned. 
 
4.2 Extension of the remedy in domain name cases 
 
It has to be acknowledged that the form of the remedy proposed here does deviate in certain 
respects from the order for delivery up as it is conventionally understood. It also needs to be 
emphasized, however, that such an extension is not entirely without precedent. There is at 
least one category of case in which the courts have seen fit to order a form of delivery up 
amounting to the transfer of something very close to – though not precisely – an intangible 
property right.72 This has occurred in disputes surrounding domain names, particularly those 
involving so-called ‘cybersquatting’, where an unauthorized third party registers domain 
names that are identical or similar to well-known trade marks or trade names with the 
intention of offering them for sale – typically at extortionate rates – to the owners of those 
trade marks or the goodwill in those trade names. The leading case on this issue remains 
British Telecommunications plc v One in a Million Ltd.73 The defendants here dealt in 
internet domain names, and had registered a large number of domain names comprising the 
trade marks or trade names of well-known commercial enterprises. The defendants offered 
                                                          
71 See Evitt v Price (1827) 1 Sim 483; Alperton Rubber Co v Manning (1917) 86 LJ Ch 377. 
72 At present, domain names are not regarded as property under English law, though there is some authority to 
the contrary under US law. For an overview, see S Burshtein, ‘Is a Domain Name Property?’ (2005) 1 Journal 
of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 59. 
73 [1998] FSR 265; [1999] 1 WLR 903. 
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these domain names for sale to the relevant companies, and the companies commenced legal 
proceedings against them for passing off and trade mark infringement. 
 At first instance, Jonathan Sumption QC (as he then was), sitting as a deputy judge of 
the High Court, granted summary judgment in favour of the claimants. He held that the 
defendants were liable in passing off for having created ‘instruments of deception’ through 
the registration of the domain names,74 and were also liable for trade mark infringement in 
having used in the course of trade domain names that were very similar to the claimants’ 
well-known marks, to the detriment of those marks.75 For the purposes of the present 
discussion, what is of particular importance is the form of relief Sumption QC saw fit to grant 
to the claimants. Not only were the claimants awarded a prohibitory injunction to restrain the 
defendants from using the domain names in question, they were also granted a mandatory 
injunction directing the defendants to take steps to assign the disputed domain names to them. 
In his judgment, Sumption QC drew a direct analogy between this latter remedy and the order 
for delivery up in its conventional form, stating that: 
 
I accept that [such] an order … goes rather further than the negative form of injunctions normally 
appropriate quia timet. But it seems to me to be the most completely effective r medy, and one which 
does no injustice to the defendants, for these names are of no value to them otherwise than as a means 
                                                          
74 [1998] FSR 265, 270 – 272. The doctrine of instruments of deception makes it passing off for a trader to put 
into circulation goods that are inherently likely to deceive the ultimate purchasers, ev n though the immediate 
purchasers might be retailers or middlemen who are unlikely to be deceived: see C Wadlow, The Law of Passing 
Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), [5-137] – [5-184]. 
75 [1998] FSR 265, 272 – 273. See Trade Marks Act 1994, s 10(3) (making it infringement for an unauthorized 
third party to use in the course of trade a sign that is identical or similar to a registered trade mark that has a 
reputation in the UK, where the use of the sign takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to the distinctive 
character or the repute of the trade mark). 
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of threatening unlawful acts. It is the equivalent, in this rather arcane context, of the delivery up of 
infringing goods.76 
 
The decision of Sumption QC was affirmed on appeal.77 At the Court of Appeal, Aldous LJ 
commented favourably on the form of remedy granted at first instance, noting that there was 
‘ample evidence to justify the injunctive relief granted … to prevent [the domain names] 
being used for a fraudulent purpose and to prevent them being transferred to others’.78 
 Since then, orders directing defendants in a case of this type to assign or transfer the 
disputed domain names to successful claimants are routinely sought and awarded.79 What is 
also significant is that, while the judicial analysis of the passing off and trade mark claims in 
One in a Million has often been criticized as taking an unduly expansive view of the elements 
of each action,80 virtually none of this criticism has been directed at the form of relief 
                                                          
76 [1998] FSR 265, 274. 
77 See also [1999] 1 WLR 903, 924 (Aldous LJ holding, additionally, that the fact that the defendants would be 
identified as the registrants of the relevant domain names through a ‘Whois’ search conducted by members of 
the public constituted a false representation of an association between the defendants and the claimants, which 
amounted to passing off). 
78 [1999] 1 WLR 903, 925. 
79 See in particular Radio Taxicabs (London) Ltd v Owner Drivers Radio Taxi Services Ltd [2004] RPC 19, [4] 
(expressly seeking ‘an order for delivery up of’ the disputed domain name to the claimant). See also WH Smith 
Ltd v Colman [2001] FSR 9, [3]; Easyjet Airline Co Ltd v Dainty (t/a E syRealestate) [2002] FSR 6, [23] – [27]; 
Phones 4u Ltd v Phone4.u.co.uk Internet Ltd [2005] EWHC 334 (Ch), [72]; Tesco Stores Ltd v Elogicom [2006] 
EWHC 403 (Ch), [27], [42]; Yell Ltd v Giboin [2011] EWPCC 009, [185]; Vertical Leisure Ltd v Poleplus Ltd 
[2014] EWHC 2077 (IPEC), [12], [25]. 
80 See M Elmslie, ‘The One in a Million Case’ (1998) 9 Entertainment Law Review 283; R Meyer-Rochow, 
‘The Application of Passing Off as a Remedy Against Domain Name Piracy’ (1998) 20 European Intellectual 
Property Review 405; C Colston, ‘Passing Off: The Right Solution to Domain Name Disputes?’ [2000] Lloyd’s 
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awarded in that case81 – even though, as Sumption QC himself acknowledged, it did go 
beyond what might be expected in a more conventional case. Thus, while the extension of the 
order for delivery up in this way might, at first blush, appear to be at odds with the remedy in 
its more conventional form, this development has attracted virtually no controversy so far, 
nor has it been said to produce any unintended negative consequences in practice. 
 
4.3 Justifying the extension of the remedy in cases involving revenge porn 
 
It is submitted that the reasons accepted in cases such as One in a Million as justifying an 
order for the delivery up – in a manner of speaking – of the disputed domain names apply 
with at least equal force to successful claims of misuse of private information that are 
founded upon the non-consensual distribution of the claimant’s private sexual images, so as 
to justify an order for the ‘delivery up’ of the copyright in those images in cases where such 
copyright vests in the defendant. Like the transfer of disputed domain names to a successful 
claimant in a cybersquatting case, the assignment of the copyright in the offending images 
would provide the claimant with ‘the most completely effective remedy’, as it would put the 
claimant in the best position to prevent the further distribution of those images and, by 
extension, further invasions of their privacy. It would therefore enhance the effectiveness of 
the injunctive relief awarded against the defendant: while a typical prohibitory injunction 
would restrain the defendant themselves from engaging in further unauthorized distribution 
of the images in question, this in itself would not be adequate to safeguard the claimant’s 
privacy, given the nature of information flows on the internet. As with the cybersquatting 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 523; H Carty, ‘Passing Off and Instruments of Deception: The Need 
for Clarity’ (2003) 25 European Intellectual Property Review 188; Wadlow (n 74) [5-161] – [5-167]. 
81 cf A Sims, ‘Rethinking One in a Million’ (2004) 26 European Intellectual Property Review 442, 444. 
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cases, such an order is unlikely to result in injustice to the defendant in a typical case since, 
like the disputed domain names in One in a Million, there is no legitimate means by which 
the copyright in such images might be exploited commercially.82 
 Admittedly, this modified version of the order for delivery up is something of a 
departure from what might be expected in a more typical case of breach of confidence or 
misuse of private information, in that it is intended to prevent the future dissemination of the 
claimant’s private information not so much by the defendant themselves as by third parties. 
However, it is submitted that this modification to the conventional form of the order is 
justified by the nature of revenge porn itself, the harms caused by it, the ease and speed with 
which information can be transmitted online, and the extraordinary difficulty of obtaining any 
other effective remedy against third-party website operators, particularly where they are 
located outside the jurisdiction of the English courts. In this context, regard should also be 
had to article 13 of the ECHR, which imposes on signatories an obligation to provide for 
effective remedies under national law for any breach of the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
it, as well as article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which imposes a statutory duty on the 
courts to act compatibly with these fundamental rights, including the right of privacy 
protected under article 8.83 Indeed, even in more conventional cases of breach of confidence, 
the courts appear increasingly willing to adapt the order for delivery up so as to take account 
of the realities of information storage and transmission in the digital environment. In Arthur J 
Gallagher Services (UK) Ltd v Skriptchenko,84 for instance, the High Court had no difficulty 
                                                          
82 cf Renault UK Ltd v Derivatives Risks Evaluation Management Ltd (Unreported, 22 October 2001), [21] 
(counsel for the claimant conceding that the transfer of the disputed domain name to the claimant could not be 
sought, as the domain name could legitimately be used for a range of purp ses).  
83 On the interpretation of this requirement, see Klass v Federal Republic of Germany (1979 – 80) 2 EHRR 214, 
[65] – [69]; Ilhan v Turkey (2002) 34 EHRR 36, [97]; Kudla v Poland (2002) 35 EHRR 11, [157]. 
84 [2016] EWHC 603 (QB). 
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in making an order which directed the delivery up of the defendant’s electronic devices to the 
claimant for imaging and inspection, followed by the deletion of any confidential information 
present on those devices and their subsequent return to the defendant.85 
In addition, in at least some of the domain name cases, the courts have taken into 
account the possibility that the disputed domain names might be misused should they fall into 
the hands of third parties in deciding whether or not to order them to be transferred to the 
claimants. A case in point is Easyjet Airline Co Ltd v Dainty (t/a EasyRealestate),86 where the 
claimant airline and associated companies within the same group succeded in their action for 
passing off against the defendant, who had registered a domain name – easyRealestate.co.uk 
– that bore a close resemblance to the claimants’ trade marks.87 Bernard Livesey QC (sitting 
as a deputy judge of the High Court) had initially considered it sufficient to confine the 
remedy to an injunction restraining the defendant from passing off any business as the 
claimants’ through the use of the domain name.88 At the conclusion of the hearing, however, 
he decided to grant an additional order directing the defendant to take the steps necessary for 
transferring the domain name to the claimants. This was due in part to the real possibility that 
the defendant might sell the domain name to a third party, who might in turn use it in such a 
way as to cause damage to the claimants.89 
A key advantage of the present proposal is that any intervention would take place only 
at the remedy stage of the legal proceedings. Because of this, it causes no disruption to the 
                                                          
85 [2016] EWHC 603 (QB), [37] – [40], [63]. See also Imerman v Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA Civ 908, [73]; 
Warm Zones v Thurley [2014] EWHC 988 (QB), [3], [35].  
86 [2002] FSR 6. 
87 The defendant had used the domain name to host a website whose design resembled the claimants’ distinctive 
get-up.  
88 [2002] FSR 6, [23]. 
89 [2002] FSR 6, [23] – [28]. 
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existing framework of copyright law. Unlike the solutions put forward by other 
commentators, the present proposal does not call for any reconceptualization of established 
copyright principles, and therefore poses no risk of unsettling concluded transactions or 
fragmenting copyright ownership in undesirable ways. Furthermore, because the remedy of 
delivery up is one that falls within the equitable jurisdiction of the court, judges would retain 
the discretion to determine whether such an order should be granted or refused on the 
particular facts of each case.90 This functions as an additional safeguard against abuse.  
 
4.4 Comparison with the proposed remedy of a constructive trust 
 
A final objection to the new form of remedy proposed here is that it goes further than the 
domain name cases in terms of its effect. At present, domain names are not recognized as a 
species of property under English law. Because of this, an order for the transfer of a domain 
name, like an order for delivery up in its conventional form, does not result in the reallocation 
of any property rights as between the parties. In contrast, the remedy proposed here would 
require the defendant to effect an assignment of what is undoubtedly an intangible property 
right in favour of the claimant. 
 In response to this, it has to be pointed out that the notion of a claimant acquiring 
property rights over an asset – whether tangible or intangible – that has been obtained by a 
defendant through the misuse of the claimant’s confidential information is not unheard of. 
Such a possibility was contemplated by no less a body than the House of Lords itself, in the 
well-known case of Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2).91 This concerned 
                                                          
90 See Mergenthaler Linotype Co v Intertype Ltd (1926) 43 RPC 381, 382. See Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v 
Campbell Engineering Co Ltd [1948] 56 RPC 203, 219. 
91 [1990] 1 AC 109. 
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the book Spycatcher, which had been written by Peter Wright, a former officer of the British 
Security Service. The book purported to be an account of his twenty years of service, and 
contained allegations of irregularities and unlawful activities that had been carried out by 
members of the Security Service during that time. The Attorney-General, on behalf of the 
Crown, brought an action in breach of confidence and sought an injunction to restrain the 
defendant newspapers from publishing extracts from the book.92 What is significant for the 
purposes of the present discussion is that, although the Crown had not sought to rely on any 
claim founded on copyright,93 judges at every stage of the proceedings nevertheless felt 
compelled to make some comment as to the possible outcome had it chosen to do so.94 At 
first instance, Scott J observed that, had such a claim been advanced, the argument that the 
Crown should be treated as the owner of the copyright in the book ‘would seem to have some 
merit’, as the book was the product of Wright’s breach of his duty of confidence to the 
Crown.95 A similar view was expressed by Dillon LJ in the Court of Appeal, who remarked 
that ‘there could have been strong arguments’ for saying that the copyright in the book 
belonged in equity to the Crown and was held on a constructive trust for it.96 This view was 
also shared by several members of the House of Lords. Lord Keith noted that, had the Crown 
sought to advance the claim that it was in equity the owner of the copyright in the book, such 
                                                          
92 The House of Lords held that the Attorney-General was not entitled to an injunct on to restrain the Observer 
and Guardian newspapers from further publication of information derived from the book, nor to an injunction to 
restrain the Sunday Times from continued serialization of the book. However, the Attorney-General was held to 
be entitled to an account of the profits accruing to the Sunday Times as a result of the serialization. 
93 [1990] 1 AC 109, 194. 
94 For a summary, see SK Ng, ‘The Spycatcher Saga: Its Implications and Effect on the Law of Confidence’ 
(1990) 32 Malaya Law Review 1, 82 – 86. 
95 [1990] 1 AC 109, 140 – 141. 
96 [1990] 1 AC 109, 211. 
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an argument ‘might well succeed’,97 while Lord Griffiths expressed agreement with the view 
of Scott J and Dillon LJ that ‘the copyright in Spycatcher is probably vested in the Crown’.98 
Lord Goff, meanwhile, remarked that ‘there is some ground’ for the argument that the 
copyright in the book was held by Wright on constructive trust for the Crown.99 
 As the Crown in that case chose not to pursue a claim in copyright, these remarks are 
of course merely obiter dicta. There is as yet no English case in which a defendant has been 
held to be a constructive trustee of property acquired by them through the misuse of the 
claimant’s confidential or private information.100 Nevertheless, the fact that this view found 
favour with so many members of the bench at each level of the proceedings remains 
significant. In this context, it should be noted courts elsewhere in the common law world 
have been known to make use of the constructive trust as a remedy for successful claims in 
breach of confidence. An example is the Canadian case of Lac Minerals Ltd v International 
Corona Resources Ltd,101 where the defendant had obtained a valuable piece of land through 
the misuse of the claimant’s confidential information. The Supreme Court of Canada decided, 
                                                          
97 [1990] 1 AC 109, 262 – 263. 
98 [1990] 1 AC 109, 276. 
99 [1990] 1 AC 109, 288. 
100 Though there are cases that have come close to doing so: see British Syphon Co Ltd v Homewood [1956] 1 
WLR 1190; Missing Link Software v Magee [1989] 1 FSR 361; Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 
1 AC 324; Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd [1997] RPC 289; Service Corporation International 
plc v Channel Four Television Corporation [1999] EMLR 83; United Pan-Europe Communications NV v 
Deutsche Bank AG [2000] EWCA Civ 166; Markem Corp v Zipher Ltd [2005] RPC 31. See also Attorney-
General v Blake [1997] Ch 84, 96. cf Satnam Investments Ltd v Dunlop Heywood & Co Ltd [1999] FSR 722, 
743 – 744; University of Southampton’s Applications [2006] RPC 21, [42]; Yeda Research and Development Co 
Ltd v Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc [2008] RPC 1, [62]. 
101 [1989] 2 SCR 574. 
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by a majority, that the land was held by the defendant on a constructive trust for the 
claimant.102  
 The appropriateness of a constructive trust as a remedy for breach of confidence has 
been questioned by commentators, many of whom regard the idea with a high degree of 
scepticism.103 The most prominent criticisms relate to the lack of established principles under 
English law for determining when such a constructive trust might be imposed, as well as its 
potential for disrupting concluded transactions and settled property rights. Still, the cases 
outlined above show that the idea of a claimant gaining property rights in an asset obtained 
through the unauthorized use of their confidential information is not as unprecedented as it 
might appear. 
 The new form of remedy proposed in this article does not go anywhere as far as the 
imposition of a constructive trust. In particular, it does not entail the creation of an equitable 
proprietary right in favour of the claimant at the instance of the court, nor does it involve the 
judicial redistribution of the defendant’s property rights, potentially with retrospective effect. 
Instead, it merely subjects the defendant in a successful claim for misuse of private 
information founded upon the non-consensual distribution of private sexual images to a 
                                                          
102 See also Pre-Cam Exploration & Development Ltd v McTavish [1966] SCR 551. For decisions to a similar 
effect in other jurisdictions, see Shellmar Products Co v Allen-Qualley Co 36 F 2d 623; Ohio Oil Co v Sharp 
135 F 2d 303; Saco-Lowell Shops v Reynolds 141 F 2d 587; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah 
Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63, [102]. 
103 See HW Tang, ‘Confidence and the Constructive Trust’ (2003) 23 Legal Studies 135, 139 – 152; D Sheehan, 
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personal obligation to assign any copyright they may have in those images to the claimant.104 
The nature of the proposed remedy also obviates the need for the courts to grapple with 
unresolved questions concerning the place of the ‘remedial’ – as opposed to the ‘institutional’ 
– constructive trust within English law,105 as well as the nature of confidential or private 
information itself and the extent to which it constitutes a ‘proprietary base’ justifying the 
imposition of a constructive trust.106 Given that the radical remedy of a constructive trust was 
well within the contemplation of the courts in cases such as Attorney-General v Guardian, it 
is submitted that the much more moderate remedy proposed here merits at least the same 
degree of consideration. 
 
4.5 Drawbacks of the proposal 
 
The new form of remedy put forward in this article is, of course, not without its drawbacks. 
First of all, it is something of a makeshift solution, as it relies on a procedure developed to 
tackle the problem of online copyright infringement to safeguard an entirely unrelated set of 
interests. Because of this, it runs the risk of mischaracterizing the harm at issue as the simple 
                                                          
104 See P Birks, ‘The Remedies for Abuse of Confidential Information’ [1990] Lloyd’s Maritime and 
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breach of a property right.107 Furthermore, it cannot be denied that the proposed remedy is 
dependent on the capacity of copyright to function as a tool for the suppression of 
information. While the present proposal seeks to harness that capacity for ends that are 
entirely benign, it should not be forgotten that this has also been deployed for purposes that 
are far from praiseworthy. Assertions of copyright infringement have been made in order to 
prevent the disclosure of information relating to a controversial religious movement,108 to 
restrain potentially negative commentary on well-known public figures,109 and even to 
suppress third-party criticism.110 It should also be remembered that the notice and takedown 
procedure itself is open to abuse. Researchers in the US have found examples of notifications 
being issued to prevent lawful uses of copyright-protected material, notifications being issued 
by parties who are not the copyright owners of the material in question, and notifications 
being used to remove material that is not protected by copyright in the first place.111 From a 
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broader perspective, there is also something disquieting about the fact that in ellectual 
property rights are accorded much stronger protections compared to privacy rights in almost 
all jurisdictions, such that recourse to property-based reasoning remains the most effective 
way of safeguarding an individual’s privacy rights.112 
 At a more practical level, the nature of proposed remedy means that it can only be 
obtained at the conclusion of a successful action in the tort of misuse of private information. 
Victims of revenge porn who do not have the resources to initiate and maintain a civil suit 
might therefore struggle to avail themselves of it.113 In addition, the nature of the notice and 
takedown procedure means that claimants must issue a fresh notification to the relevant 
website operator each time a new instance of the offending image is uploaded or reposted;114 
most copyright legislation does not impose on hosting providers a further obligation to ensure 
that material that has been removed pursuant to such a notification does not resurface, or to 
engage in the pre-emptive monitoring and filtering of material uploaded by their users.115 Still, 
until such time as higher international standards of protection for privacy rights are 
implemented and suitable remedies are put in place for enforcing them, the proposal outlined 
here will at least provide victims of revenge porn with an urgently-needed remedy against the 
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operators of websites through which their private sexual images are distributed, 





Despite the progress that has been made by the law in terms of criminalizing revenge porn 
and providing redress for its harms, victims of revenge porn still face significant challenges 
in obtaining the remedy they most urgently require, namely the removal of their images from 
the websites through which they have been distributed. In these circumstances, copyright has 
emerged as a somewhat unlikely weapon for victims of revenge porn. Where the copyright in 
the offending images is vested in the victim, they will be able to compel the removal of those 
images through the use of the notice and takedown procedure found in the copyright laws of 
many jurisdictions. Where the copyright in the images is vested in the perpetrator or a third 
party, however, the victim is unable to have recourse to the notice and takedown procedure. 
Because of this, some commentators have suggested that the subjects of such images should 
be recognized as their joint authors, or that they should be given a new exclusive right to 
prevent the distribution and display of the images in question. While these proposals are well-
intentioned, they would have the effect of disrupting fundamental principles of copyright law 
in ways that are disproportionate to the aim of providing victims of revenge porn with an 
effective remedy. 
 The present article puts forward an alternative solution, drawing inspiration from the 
terms of the settlement in the case of Chambers v DCR. It argues that, where a claimant has 
succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief against a defendant in the tort of misuse of private 
information, and where the claim is based on the defendant’s non-consensual distribution of 
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the claimant’s private sexual images, the court may in a suitable case make a further order 
directing the defendant to assign any copyright they may have in the images to the claimant, 
for the purpose of enabling the claimant to compel the removal of those images from third-
party websites. This would be akin to the well-established remedy of delivery up ‘in aid of’ 
an injunction. This new form of remedy is not without precedent. In cases involving 
cybersquatting, the English courts have had little difficulty adapting the order for delivery up 
so as to compel the transfer of disputed domain names from one party to another, while in 
more recent cases of breach of confidence, they have seen fit to modify the conventional form 
of the order so as to give due recognition to the realities of information storage and retrieval 
in the digital environment. The English courts have even gone so far as to contemplate the 
imposition of a constructive trust on assets acquired in breach of confidence – a radical form 
of remedy that goes well beyond the solution presented here. The proposed remedy requires 
no reconceptualization of fundamental copyright principles, and therefore poses no risk of 
unsettling concluded transactions or disrupting the careful balance struck by copyright. 
Despite its shortcomings, therefore, it fills a vital gap in the array of remedies available to 
victims of revenge porn, pending the development of a more comprehensive set of measures. 
